



ÁLLAMI
SZÁMVEVŐSZÉK

DR. LÁSZLÓ WINDISCH
PRESIDENT
STATE AUDIT OFFICE OF HUNGARY

Our ref.: NF-0005-129/2025
Budapest, September 29. 2025

Mr. Alain Berset
Secretary General

Council of Europe

Strasbourg

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

I am writing to you in my capacity as President of the State Audit Office of Hungary (SAO) in relation to the draft report published by the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) on 12 September 2025.

While we fully respect the role of the Monitoring Committee in assessing the fulfilment of obligations by member states, I must express serious concern regarding several inaccurate and misleading statements contained in the draft report, particularly in points B/26, B/36, and B/62.

1. Clarification Regarding Point B/26

Point B/26 of the report incorrectly claims that the State Audit Office examined the campaign financing of opposition parties with a different approach than that of the ruling parties. It is also untrue that this led to a biased decision. This is solely a false narrative created by the parties caught committing serious legal violations, which your report adopted and accepted as true without criticism or consulting the State Audit Office. The reality, however, is that the State Audit Office examined the financing of all parties using the same methodology, and only the significantly different factual circumstances resulted in the differences in findings. A brief summary of this is also available on our website ([information material](#)) and we are attaching a printed copy.

2. Concerns Regarding Points B/36 and B/62

These sections of the draft report express opinions on the requirements for the appointment and election of the President of the SAO, which lack objectivity and disregard the prevailing constitutional and legal framework of the election procedure in Hungary. The draft report fails to acknowledge that the President of the SAO is elected by a two-thirds majority of the Hungarian National Assembly, reflecting an exceptionally broad political consensus. This requirement ensures

the independence and legitimacy of the institution and is a safeguard that exceeds the standards applied in many EU member states.


To our knowledge, no other European jurisdiction allows the head of its supreme audit institution to be elected by a minority group of MPs. The Hungarian model, therefore, represents a robust and democratic approach to institutional and operational independence.

In light of the above, I respectfully and firmly request that the Monitoring Committee correct the factual inaccuracy in point B/26 and revise the statements in points B/36 and B/62 to reflect a more balanced and legally grounded assessment.

We remain committed to constructive dialogue and cooperation with the Council of Europe and its institutions.

Thank you for directing your attention to this matter.

Yours sincerely,



dr. László Windisch
President

ÁLLAMTITKARSÁG
SZÁMVEVŐSZÉK
ELNÖK

CC:

1. Mr. Theodoros Rousopoulos, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
2. Ms. Zanda Kalniņa-Lukaševica, Chairperson Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)